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CURATIVE STATUTES OF COLORADO RESPECTING
TITLES TO REAL ESTATE
By PERCY S. MORRIS, of the Denver BarN o lawyer likes to "turn down" a title as unmerchant-
able. Occasionally a disappointed owner and would-
be seller or a real estate broker may feel that a lawyer
takes a fiendish glee in rejecting a title as unmerchantable,
but this feeling is entirely unwarranted.
The title to real estate, which a lawyer is called upon to
examine and pass upon, is the title that is shown by written
instruments of record. Necessarily, therefore, the examination
of and passing on the title is a technical matter of examining
these papers which have been filed of record and determining
whether they show a title that appears good or whether there
are defects in the title so shown.
The attorney making the examination does so on behalf
of a client who desires to purchase the property or to make
a loan. If he passes the title as good, his labors after com-
pleting the examination are comparatively simple, consisting
of writing a brief opinion stating the title is good, subject of
course to such encumbrances, restrictions, tax liens, etc., as
may exist, preparing the necessary papers and closing up the
deal, and in such case his client is relieved and satisfied, the
owner of the property is likewise and everyone is happy. But,
if the lawyer turns down the title as unmerchantable, his trou-
bles have just commenced; he must write an opinion setting
forth the facts concerning the defect and the reasons why same
renders the title unmerchantable and then he must explain the
matter to his client and tell him why it is that he is compelled
to reject the title and then follows a session with the owner,
going into again with him the matter, and possibly a similar
one with the real estate agent, and then usually comes arguing
out the matter with some other lawyer who has previously
passed the title, all of which involves a large amount of time
and discussion and conditions which can not be considered
enjoyable to the attorney, with no additional compensation
to him for the same.
But a lawyer of course can not pass the title because
rejecting it would impose upon him additional time, work
and unpleasantness. If he finds in the title a defect which
under the law or under the recognized practice would render
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the title unmerchantable, he must reject it; if he does not do
so, he is not true to his client and he subjects himself to the
danger of having his client come back to him in the future
because of such title being rejected by an attorney examining
for a prospective purchaser or lender.
There are of course various kinds and degrees of defects
in titles. It requires an expert knowledge and a nice sense
of discrimination to distinguish between defects which may
be considered as immaterial and of no consequence, on the one
hand, and defects which are substantial, on the other hand.
And a defect which is purely a technical one and which does
not mean that the purported owner of same does not as a
matter of fact own the property nevertheless may render the
title unmerchantable on the face of the records.
The foregoing are platitudes but they are merely an
introduction to statements as to the reasons which have
prompted the passage of the various statutes which, especially
during the last seventeen years, have from time to time been
passed by the Colorado Legislature to remedy various de-
fects in record titles and to make titles to real estate more
merchantable. From time to time during such period groups
of lawyers, a substantial portion of whose practice consists of
examination of titles, have conferred together, discussed cura-
tive statutes which might be passed, agreed upon their phrase-
ology and assisted in having them put through the Legisla-
ture. They did this in the interests of the public and, in a
sense, against their own selfish interests in that the passage of
a number of these statutes has meant that lawyers would not
be employed to bring suits to quiet title which they would
have been employed to bring had the statutes not been passed.
In selecting defects to be remedied by curative statutes
and in preparing the statutes there was required a fine sense
of balance between matters, on the one hand, which involved
actual substantive rights of which the owners thereof might
be deprived by the legislation, and, on the other hand, purely
technical matters which involved no substantive rights of
which the owners would be deprived by the legislation. It
is one thing to prepare hastily a statute to remedy a certain
kind of defect in the title, but it is another thing altogether
to guard against actual interests or property rights being cut
out thereby. Therefore the number of defects in titles which
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can be eliminated by legislation without unjustly cutting out
actual property rights is not unlimited.
The legislation which was thus conceived by lawyers or
groups of lawyers to remedy technical defects in titles in this
manner falls into two classes: one class consists of those stat-
utes which make certain things appearing of record prima facie
evidence of certain matters; and the other class consists of
those statutes which impose periods of limitation upon the
assertion of rights and claims. It is believed that statutes
falling within either of these two classes are valid and consti-
tutional. Patton on Titles 224-233.
It is not the assumption of the writer in preparing this
article that the lawyers do not know of these curative stat-
utes and that they do not follow them. On the contrary, the
writer knows that the attorneys who examine titles are famil-
iar with them and follow them. The purpose of this article
is to collect in one place in an alphabetical arrangement these
various curative statutes which have from time to time over
a long period been passed and which appear in the statutes in
various places, in order to provide a source of ready reference
to which the lawyer can turn to find quickly the statute he
desires, together with an explanation as to the purpose for
which each was passed.
Abstracts. By 1927 Sess. L. 600 Sec. 34, C.S.A. Chap.
40, Sec. 140, it is provided that an abstract of title certified
by any reputable Colorado abstracter or abstract company
incorporated under the laws of Colorado may be used to
establish prima facie evidence that the chain of title is as shown
by the abstract except as to any of the instruments of convey-
ance or record thereof or certified copy thereof which may be
offered in evidence and that the Court may take judicial notice
of the repute of the abstracter and that the absence of tax sale
certificates from such abstract for any period of time covered
by the abstract shall be prima facie evidence of the payment of
taxes during such period by the party relying upon any chain
of title shown by such abstract. In Hockmuth vs. Norton,
90 Colo. 453 it was held that under this section the abstract
of title, when admitted in evidence without limitation, is"prima facie evidence that the chain of title is as shown
thereby." The purpose of this section was to do away with
the previously required laborious task of proving in an action
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the title of a litigant by introducing in evidence, one by one,
the recorded copies of each and every instrument making up
the chain of title of such litigant from the very beginning of
such chain, necessitating the carrying from the office of the
Recorder to the court room a large number of heavy books
and the identification thereof and testimony with regard
thereto of the Recorder or his Deputy and also to make simple
the proving prima facie of the payment of taxes for a period
of seven years so as to bring the case within the provisions
of C.S.A. Chap 40, Secs. 143 and 144.
Acknowledgments. Prior to 1927 the form of acknowl-
edgment set out in the Colorado statute (1921 Comp. Laws
Sec. 4899) was one quite different from the form used in most
of the other states of the Union, particularly in that the Colo-
rado form contained the words "to be his act and deed for the
uses specified therein." Repeatedly, examining attorneys
would find in the title acknowledgments which omitted either
the phrase "to be his act and deed" or the phrase "for the uses
specified therein" without the substitution of any equivalent
words and it was felt generally by examining attorneys that
each of these two separate phrases was a substantial portion of
the statutory form, so that, if either of them was omitted
without substitution of equivalent words, the acknowledg-
ment was a nullity. The omission of one or the other of
these phrases very often occurred because a deed was prepared,
executed and acknowledged in another state upon a form
printed for use in that state and containing not the Colorado
form of acknowledgment but the form of acknowledgment
in use in that state. To remedy this situation there were pre-
pared and adopted in 1927 several sections. One of these
(1927 Sess. L. 585 Sec. 1; Original 1935 C.S.A. Chap. 40,
Sec. 107; now amended by 1937 Sess. L. 477, Sec. 1; 1938
Supp. C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 107) provided a very short and
simple form of acknowledgment which, as to an individual,
merely reads: "The foregoing instrument was acknowledged
before me this --------- day of ---------------- 19 -
by ,----------------- thereby omitting the troublesome
words "to be his act and deed for the uses specified therein".
Another section (1927 Sess. L. 587, Sec. 2; C.S.A. Chap. 40,
Sec. 108) provided that, in addition to the officers then em-
powered to take acknowledgments within or without the
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United States, instruments may be acknowledged before any
Notary Public having a notarial seal. This was to cover the
condition created by the previous statute (1921 C. L. Sec.
4891 sub. Third) not having permitted an acknowledgment
to be made before a notary public outside of the United States
or its possessions. Another section (1927 Sess. L. 588, Sec.
4; C.S.A. Chap. 40 Sec. 110) provided that all instruments
affecting title to real property in this state which shall have
been theretofore executed or should be thereafter executed pur-
porting to have been acknowledged or proved out of this
state before a notary public or other officer empowered by the
laws of this state to take acknowledgments, if the form of
acknowledgment be in substantial compliance with the laws
of the state or territory where taken or in substantial compli-
ance with the requirements of the present statutes of Colorado,
shall be deemed prima facie to have been properly acknowl-
edged or proved before proper officers. This section made
good any acknowledgment previously made in a form used
in the state where it was made but not in accordance with the
previously prescribed Colorado form and also any acknowl-
edgment which had been previously made if it was substan-
tially in the form prescribed by the present statutes and was
taken by an official authorized by the present statutes to take
acknowledgments.
Acknowledgments of Instruments Remaining of Record
M6re than Twenty Years. A large number of defects in titles
arise through defects in the acknowledgments to instruments
in the chain of title. In order to correct these defects arising
from defective acknowledgments or total lack of acknowl-
edgments, where the instruments in question have been of
record for a long time, there was passed in 1913 (1913 Sess.
L. 319; 1921 Comp. Laws, Sec. 4906) a statute which, as
amended in .1927, appears as 1935 C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 111
and as amended in 1937 appears as 1937 Sess. L. 481, 1938
Supp. C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 111. This statutes provided that
instruments affecting title to real property which have re-
mained or shall have remained of record in the office of the
Recorder of the county where the real property affected is
situate for a period of twenty years, although unacknowl-
edged or not acknowledged according to law, shall be received
and may be read in evidence and the same or the record thereof
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or a certified copy of the record thereof shall be received and
may be read in evidence without additional proof of the exe-
cution thereof in the same manner and with the same force
and effect as if they had been properly acknowledged and
proved according to law. The 1937 amendment, for the same
reasons as are mentioned herein under the heading "Recording
a Long Time After Execution of Instrument", inserted in
the statute the words "irrespective of the length of time that
may have elapsed between the date of any such instrument
and the date when same was so recorded". Because of this
statute it is unnecessary and useless for an examining attorney
to devote any time to checking the sufficiency in form of an
acknowledgment to an instrument if the instrument shall have
been of record for twenty years or more because, even if he
finds the acknowledgment defective, such defect is of no con-
squence in view of the language of the statute.
Building and Use Restrictions. Considerable trouble
has been encountered by examining attorneys through there
appearing in the chain of title (usually in a deed of convey-
ance) provisions which not only impose building restrictions
but provide for the forfeiture of the title in the event that
such building restrictions are violated. An attorney will
naturally hesitate about passing the title for the making of
a loan by a client if his client's lien can be cut out through the
title of the owner being forfeited because of the owner vio-
lating the restrictions. Because of this there was passed 1927
Sess. L. 606, Secs. 46 and 47, C.S.A. Chap. 40, Secs. 153 and
154, which provide that building restrictions and all restric-
tions as to the use or occupancy of real property shall be
strictly construed and that restrictions which provide for the
forfeiture of title to or an interest in real property because of
the violation of the restrictions on other real property (the
parcels of real property being owned by different persons)
shall be construed as applying only to the property embraced
in the restriction and owned by the party on whose property
the violation of the restriction occurred and that no action
shall be commenced or maintained to recover possession of
real property or to enforce the terms of any restriction con-
cerning real property or to compel the removal of any build-
ing or improvement because of the violation of any of the
terms of any restriction unless said action is commenced within
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one year from the date of the violation for which the action
is sought to be brought or maintained.
Construction of Curative Statutes. As is seen from a
glance through this article, a large number of the curative
statutes mentioned herein were adopted in 1927 and were in
Chapter 150 of the Session Laws of that year. Section 44
on page 605 thereof, being C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 151, states
that it is the purpose and intention of the 1927 Act to render
titles to real property and every interest therein more secure
and marketable and that it is declared to be the policy in this
state that said act and all other acts and laws concerning or
affecting title to real property and every interest therein and
all recorded instruments, decrees and orders of court of record,
including proceedings in the suits wherein such orders or de-
crees may have been entered shall be liberally construed and
with the end in view of rendering such titles absolute and free
from technical defects and so that subsequent purchasers and
encumbrancees may rely on the record title and so that the
record title of the party in possession shall be sustained and
not be defeated by technical or strict construction.
Contracts of Sale. See Options to Purchase.
Corporations. In 1927 there were passed two sections
relating respectively to execution in the name of a corporation
of a deed before the filing of its incorporation papers and the
execution in the name of a corporation of a deed after expira-
tion of its existence where there was an attempted renewal or
extension of its existence. Such sections are 1927 Sess. L.
607, Secs. 49 and 50, C.S.A. Chap. 40, Secs. 156 and 157.
The first of these sections provides that, if at the time of the
delivery of a deed describing the grantee as a corporation, no
incorporation papers have been filed and if thereafter proper
incorporation papers shall be filed, the title to the property
shall vest in the grantee as soon as the grantee is incorporated
and no other instrument of conveyance shall be required. The
second section provides that where the corporate existence of
any corporation shall expire and there shall be an attempted
renewal or extension of its corporate existence, either within
the time provided for by law or thereafter, a conveyance there-
after by such purported corporation shall vest in the grantee
the interest of the former corporation. As to cases where the
deeds had been executed before the time when these sections
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went into effect, it is provided in the first of such sections that
it shall be conclusively presumed that the title vested in the
incorporators in trust for the grantee and that said incorpora-
tors properly conveyed the real property to the grantee when
the grantee was incorporated unless within one year from the
time the section went into effect there shall be filed in the office
of the proper Recorder a written explanation or statement of
the transaction signed and acknowledged by the proper parties
and it is provided in the second of said sections that the title
or interest so conveyed shall be presumed to have been prop-
erly passed to the grantee unless an action be brought within
one year from the time the section became effective to establish
a different result.
Death, Certificates of. It very often is necessary in order
to have a merchantable title that the death of a person be
prima facie shown on the records. This arises most frequently
in cases where a life estate is devised or conveyed. By C.S.A.
Chap. 78, Sec. 128, a certified copy of the record of the death
of one dying in Colorado made and kept in accordance with
sections 104 to 114 of said chapter is made prima facie evi-
dence of the facts therein stated. This, however, left the ques-
tion of whether, if the death occurred outside of Colorado, a
certified copy of the Certificate of Death issued by the official
of the foreign state would be admissible in evidence in a Colo-
rado court and certainly, if it was recorded in the office of the
Recorder, the copy thereof in the records of the Recorder
would not be admissible in evidence. Therefore in 1927
there was passed a statute (1927 Sess. L. 591, Sec. 11; C.S.A
Chap. 40, Sec. 117) providing that a certificate of death
issued by a public official (whose apparent official duties in-
clude the keeping of records of death) of any state, territory,
county, parish, district, city, town, village, province, nation
or other governmental agency or subdivision thereof or a copy
of any such certificate of death certified by such public official
or by the county clerk and recorder of any county in the State
of Colorado in whose office the same or a certified copy thereof
shall have been recorded shall, insofar as the death may affect
any interest in real property, be prima facie evidence of the
death so certified and of the time and place of such death and
shall be admissible in evidence in any court in Colorado, and
that such method of proving death shall not be exclusive.
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Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds. 1927 Sess. L.
603-604, Secs. 39 and 40, C.S.A. Chap 40, Secs. 146 and
147 contain provisions which are probably the most helpful
statutory provisions that have ever been passed in Colorado in
the removal of defects in titles which otherwise would require
the titles to be rejected as unmerchantable. Said Sec. 146 pro-
vides that no action shall be commenced or maintained against
a person in possession of real property to question or to attack
the validity of or to set aside upon any ground or for any
reason whatsoever any final decree or final order of any court
of record of this state or any instrument of conveyance, deed,
certificate of sale or release executed by any private trustee,
successor in trust, Public Trustee, sheriff, marshal, public
officer or officers or appointee of a court when such document
shall be the source of or in aid of or in explanation of the
title or chain of title or right of the party in possession or
any of his predecessors or grantors, insofar as the same may
affect the title or explain any matter connected with the title
in reference to said real property, if such document shall have
been recorded and have remained of record 'in the office of the
Recorder where said real property is situated for a period of
seven years. Said section further provides that any and all
defects, irregularities, want of service, defective service, lack
of jurisdiction or other grounds of invalidity, nullity or
causes or reasons whereby or wherefore any such document
might be set aside or rendered inoperative must be raised in
a suit commenced within said seven-year period and not
thereafter. Said section 147 provides that persons under legal
disability at the time the right of action first accrued and who
at the time of the expiration of the limitation applicable are
still under such disability shall have two years from the ex-
piration of a limitation to commence action and no action
shall be maintained by such persons thereafter. Said Section
146 provides that its provisions shall not apply to any of the
following cases: forged documents; during the pendency of
an action commenced prior to the expiration of said seven-
year period to set aside, modify or annul or otherwise affect
such document if notice of such action has been filed as pro-
vided by law; when such document has been by proper order
or decree of competent court avoided, annulled or rendered
inoperative; and where the party who brings the action to
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question, attack or set aside the validity of such document
or his predecessor shall have been deprived of possession
within two years of the commencement of the action. The
result of these two sections is that where a certified copy of a
decree entered in a suit affecting the title to real estate, whether
it be a foreclosure action or a suit to quiet title or an action for
declaratory judgment or any other character of action affect-
ing the title to real estate, shall have been of record in the
office of the Recorder of the county wherein the real estate
in question is situated for the period of nine years (the seven
years provided by section 146 plus the two years provided by
section 147) prior to the time of the examination of the title
and the person in whose favor such decree was entered or his
successors in interest shall be in possession of the property
at the time of the examination and for the period of two
years immediately prior thereto and no notice of pendency
of an action to attack or set aside such decree is shown by the
records and no order or decree affecting or setting aside such
decree is shown in the files of the suit or by the records in
the Recorder's office, then the decree as entered by the court
and the certified copy thereof as set out in the records of the
Recorder can be accepted by the examining attorney as being
valid and binding according to the terms and provisions on
their face as against those named therein as defendants and
those who have acquired interests from them subsequent to
the filing of the lis pendens or the certified copy of the decree,
irrespective of any defects and irregularities there may be in
the securing of service of summons in such action or in any
other proceedings in such action prior to the entry of the de-
cree. And the same result follows as to releases of deeds of
trust by Public Trustees and by private trustees and also as
to Public Trustees' Deeds, Sheriffs' Deeds, Special Master's
Deeds, Executors' and Administrators' Deeds and other con-
veyances, certificates of sale and releases executed by officials
included in the language of the section. A concrete illustra-
tion of the effect of these sections can be cited in the case of
Public Trustee's Deeds. In the article prepared by the writer
and published in the November, 1936, issue of DICTA en-
titled "Foreclosure by Sale by Public Trustee of Deeds of
Trust in Colorado", which article was prepared with the idea
of furnishing a guide to an attorney in carrying through fore-
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closure proceedings by sale by the Public Trustee, there were
set out the various steps and proceedings that should be taken
in the foreclosure and the manner in which they should be
taken to comply with the statutes and the law; and in such
article particular attention was given to the matter of the
notice of the sale that was to be given and with respect to
such notice it was stated that the publication of the notice
of sale and the mailing of such notice are the very heart of the
foreclosure proceeding and that the publication and mailing
of the notice of sale in strict compliance with the provisions
of the statute are necessary to confer power on the Public
Trustee to sell the property. However, under said sections
146 and 147, it is immaterial whether notice of the sale was
given in conformity with the provisions of the statute or not
and whether other proceedings were properly taken in the
foreclosure if the Public Trustee's Deed shall have been on
record for more than nine years and no. notice of pendency
of action to set same aside is shown in the records of the
Recorder and no decree setting it aside is shown in the records
of the Recorder and the grantee in such Public Trustee's Deed
or his successor in interest shall be in possession of the prop-
erty at the time of the examination and shall have been in
such possession for two years immediately prior thereto. It
must be borne in mind, however, that, if the decree, the release,
the certificate of purchase or the deed is defective on its face,
then said sections 146 and 147 can not cure the defects which
are shown on the face of the instrument, since these sections
operate only to prevent the setting aside of such instruments
after the same shall have remained of record for the specified
period and to make them good according to their terms.
Therefore particular attention must still be given to whether
the decree, deed or other instrument correctly states the names
of all the necessary parties and the description of the property
and all other matters which should be stated in such instru-
ment in order for it to be valid and fully effective on its face.
Deeds. See also: Acknowledgments; Corporations; De-
crees, Judgments and Official Deeds; Descriptions-Numbers
and Letters in; Executors and Administrators-Conveyances
by; Official Sales; Recitals prima facie Evidence; Recording a
Long Time after Execution of Instrument; Seals; Signature
of those Acting in Representative Capacity; Trustees; Unre-
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corded Instruments-Against Whom Invalid; and Wills-
Powers of Sale Under.
Descriptions-Numbers and Letters in. There is author-
ity for the holding that the words "Lots numbered 1 to 10",
without the addition of the word "inclusive", convey only
the lots to but not including 10 and therefore such a descrip-
tion conveys only lots numbered 1 to 9, inclusive, and does
not convey lot numbered 10. Many titles are rejected be-
cause of the omission of the word "inclusive". Feeling that
when a grantor executes a deed conveying "lots numbered 1
to 10" he intends to convey all ten lots, irrespective of what
the technical interpretation given to same might be, there was
passed in 1927 a section (1927 Sess. L. 593, Sec. 15; C.S.A.
Chap. 40, Sec. 121) providing that all instruments wherein
the parcels of property affected are not separately enumerated
or listed, but are described as being from one numbered, let-
tered or designated parcel to another, shall be construed as
including the first and last designated parcels, and also the
intervening parcels, unless a contrary intention be expressly
and clearly set forth in the instrument.
Estates-Foreclosure of Deeds of Trust Against. The
statute passed in 1905 (1905 Sess. L. 290) as amended by
1917 Sess. L. 391, C.S.A. Chap. 176, Sec. 208, provided
that no mortgage, deed of trust or other security constituting
a lien or encumbrance on any property owned by any person
at the date of his death or on the date of adjudication of
mental incompetency or which secures an indebtedness con-
stituting a claim against the estate of any decedent or mental
incompetent shall be foreclosed except in accordance with and
under the conditions prescribed by such statute. One of such
conditions was that such a deed of trust could not be fore-
closed by sale by the Public Trustee during the period of one
year after the death or adjudication unless the claim shall have
been first proven and allowed or (if the amount secured be
not a claim against the estate) until the validity of the en-
cumbrance and the amount secured thereby shall have been
first duly proved in the estate proceedings and permission
given by the County Court for such foreclosure by sale.
Under this provision, even though the proceedings for the
foreclosure by sale by the Public Trustee of a deed of trust
appeared entirely valid and regular upon the face of the rec-
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ords in the office of the Recorder and in the office of the
Public Trustee, nevertheless the sale might have been in vio-
lation of the provisions of such statute because of the person
owning the property having died or been declared incom-
petent or the person primarily liable on the indebtedness
secured thereby having died or been adjudged incompetent
and the foreclosure sale having been made less than a
year after such death or adjudication of incompetency
and no permission to foreclose by sale having been se-
cured from the County Court. To be assured that some-
thing like this might not have happened which would
impair the validity of the foreclosure it would be neces-
sary for the examining attorney to ascertain whether the
owner or any person primarily liable on the indebtedness had
died or been adjudged incompetent within a year prior to the
foreclosure sale and, if so, whether permission to foreclose by
sale had been given by the County Court. Therefore there
were passed in 1931 four sections (1931 Sess. L. 793-794,
Secs. 1-4; C.S.A. Chap. 40, Secs. 65-68) providing: that all
deeds of trust theretofore or thereafter executed to a Public
Trustee may be foreclosed by such Public Trustee in the usual
manner without regard to the fact that the indebtedness se-
cured may constitute a claim against the estate of a deceased
person and notwithstanding the death of one or more of the
owners of the real estate covered by it; that such foreclosure
should be good against the heirs at law, legatees, devisees and
creditors of any decedent and all persons claiming by, through
or under such decedent; that notice of the foreclosure proceed-
ings should be given in the usual manner to the grantor in the
deed of trust at the address stated therein as though living
and to all persons having record interests; that no notice of
the foreclosure proceedings need be given to any heir at law,
legatee, devisee, creditor or any person claiming by, through
or under the decedent unless the claim or interest of such per-
son appears of record; that no deficiency claim shall be made
or allowed against any estate where foreclosure is had under
the provisions of said four sections; that the interest and claim
of all persons in and to the real estate claiming by, through
or under any decedent, including minors and mental incompe-
tents, shall be terminated and concluded by such foreclosure
unless they shall redeem within the time prescribed by law;
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and that at the expiration of one year after said four sections
became effective all trustees' deeds theretofore issued by any
Public Trustee shall be considered valid and conclusive not-
withstanding the fact that no court order permitting foreclos-
ure had been obtained from the estate of a deceased debtor or
from the estate of a deceased owner. It is to be noted that
these four sections relate only to estates of decedents and that
they leave the 19 17 Act still in effect as to the foreclosure of
encumbrances against property owned by one who has been
adjudged a mental incompetent or securing indebtedness con-
stituting a claim against a mental incompetent. A bill has
been introduced in the present session of the Legislature to
amend said Sections 65 to 68 and also the 1917 Act to make
the situation the same with respect to mental incompetents as
it now is under Sections 65 to 68 as to decedents and, by
amending said Sec. 208 of Chap. 176, to make the filing of
a claim in the estate of a decedent or mental incompetent,
before the foreclosure sale is held, a prerequisite to the allow-
ance of a claim for any deficiency against the estate.
Executors and Administrators-Conveyances by. Un-
der the provisions of original 1935 C.S.A. Chap. 176, Sec.
95, it was required that where an executor or administra-
tor is authorized by the will to sell real estate he must,
before making the sale, secure from the Court an order author-
izing the sale and give a bond in an amount at least equal to
and not more than double the appraised value of the real
estate ordered to be sold and it was provided by said section
that no such sale shall be valid unless such bond shall be first
given and approved by the Court. In 1937 such section was
amended by 1937 Sess. L. 1365-1366, Sec. 1, 1938 C.S.A.
Supp., Chap. 176, Sec. 95, so as to provide, in the place of
the provisions above mentioned regarding securing an order
authorizing the sale and the furnishing of bond, that, if a
sale of real estate is made by an executor or by an adminis-
trator with the will annexed pursuant to a power of sale con-
tained in a will, he shall forthwith make written report to
the Court of the fact of such sale and shall include in such
report a description of the property and the consideration re-
ceived therefor and it shall then be discretionary with the
Court whether to require the personal representative to exe-
cute and file a bond, with the provision, however, that the
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failure to make such report of sale or furnish bond shall not
invalidate any such sale. In order to cure defects in titles
arising from deeds having previously been executed by the
executor or the administrator under a power of sale without
the required bond having been given, Secs. 2 and 3 on pages
1366-1367, 1937 Sess. L. provide that all sales of real estate
theretofore made pursuant to power of sale contained in a
will and which would have been valid and effective to con-
vey title except for the fact that such sale was not made pur-
suant to the terms of Sec. 95, Chap. 176, Original 1935
C.S.A. were confirmed and declared to be valid and effective
for all purposes and that no action shall be commenced or
maintained to question or set aside any sale of real estate
theretofore made pursuant to a power of sale contained in a
will upon the ground that such sale was not made in compli-
ance with the terms of said Sec. 95 unless such action be com-
menced within six months from the time that said 1 93 7 sec-
tions became effective. See also Wills-Powers of Sale under.
Homesteads. Previous to 1927 the statutes relating to
the encumbering or conveying of property, upon the margin
of the record title to which an entry of homestead had been
made, (1921 Comp. Laws, Secs. 5924-5931) required a
rather complicated procedure including the husband and wife
joining in the execution of the same instrument and the wife
voluntarily, separate and apart from her husband, signing
and acknowledging it and the officer taking the acknowledg-
ment fully apprising her of her rights and the effect of sign-
ing the instrument and the acknowledgment to such instru-
ment expressly stating compliance with the foregoing. Occa-
sionally it was found that such a conveyance was signed by
only one of the spouses and afterwards a conveyance was
signed by the other and more frequently it was found that
there was some technical insufficiency or omission in the certifi-
cate of acknowledgment so that such certificate of acknowl-
edgment did not show an exact compliance with the terms of
the statute. Feeling that too much red tape and technicality
in the present day and age should not be thrown around the
conveyance or encumbrance of homesteaded property and that
all that should be required for such conveyance or encum-
brance should be such signatures and acknowledgments as
would be required if the two spouses owned the property as
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tenants in common, there was passed in 1927 a statute (1927
Sess. L. 592, Sec. 12; C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 119) which pro-
vided that to convey or encumber a homestead both husband
and wife must execute a conveyance or encumbrance of their
respective interests therein and that the same may be one in-
strument signed by both of them or by their separate instru-
ments and that no special form of acknowledgment other than
the form provided to be used in other conveyances shall be
necessary. Also previous to the passage of this Act difficulty
was sometimes encountered in one or the other of the follow-
ing circumstances: a person who, though unmarried, was nev-
ertheless the head of a family and entitled to a homestead,
owned the property and entered it as a homestead, in which
case, when a conveyance or encumbrance of the property was
to be made, there was no spouse to join in the execution of
the instrument and there was no way except by suit in which
it could be established of record, even prima facie, that the
owner of the property was unmarried and that therefore it
was not necessary that his or her spouse also execute the in-
strument; and one of two spouses owned the property and
either of the spouses entered it as a homestead and the spouse
who was not the record owner died or was divorced, in which
case it was either impossible or exceedingly difficult to obtain
the signature of the former spouse who was not the record
owner and, although under the law, because of the death or
divorce, the signature of such spouse was not necessary to the
validity of the conveyance or encumbrance, nevertheless it was
difficult to show of record the death or divorce. To cover
these situations the said section in the 1927 law pro-ided that,
if the homestead be claimed by a person who at the time of the
conveyance or encumbrance thereof be not married, a state-
ment to that effect in such instrument shall be prima facie evi-
dence of such fact.
Judgments. See Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds.
Lien Notes. During recent years there has arisen a prac-
tice on the part of certain firms and companies of having the
property owner sign a short instrument constituting in effect
both a promissory note and a mortgage upon property.. In
most cases these instruments were executed to roofing com-
panies and in them the property owner agreed to pay the
roofing company a certain amount in certain installments for
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a new roof or for roofing repairs and gave to the roofing com-
pany a lien upon the property for the payment of same.
These instruments were acknowledged in the same manner as
other instruments affecting ttile to real estate and were then
recorded. Usually before these instruments were recorded
they were discounted by the roofing company to a finance
company and-in such cases the recorded copy of the lien note
showed an endorsement on the back of the instrument from
the roofing company to the finance company. These endorse-
ments were never acknowledged. Later, upon payment of the
indebtedness, the finance company would execute and ac-
knowledge a quit claim deed purporting to operate as a release
of the lien note. However, since the lien note was, in law and
in fact, a mortgage upon real estate, an endorsement or assign-
ment thereof was in effect an assignment of a mortgage on real
estate and such assignment could not be accepted as showing
of record the assignment of the mortgage unless it was ac-
knowledged. So that, since the assignment was only by en-
dorsement and was not acknowledged, the endorsement was
not prima facie evidence of the assignment and so the later
quit claim by the endorsee could not be accepted as releasing
the lien note. And very often, when attempts were made to
locate the roofing company in order to secure a release from it,
it was found that it had folded up and the officers or partners
thereof could not be found. In order to remedy this condition
a statute was passed in 1937 (1937 Sess. L. 479-480, Sec. 2;
1938 Supp. to C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 107 (1)) which pro-
vided where an instrument which by its terms constitutes a
promise or obligation for the payment of money and also by
its terms creates a lien on real estate as security for the pay-
ment thereof shall at the time it shall have been recorded
(whether such recording be the original recording or a record-
ing subsequent to the original one) have borne upon its face
or upon its back an assignment, transfer or endorsement
thereof, such instrument and such assignment, transfer or en-
dorsement or the recorded copy thereof or a certified copy of
the recorded copy thereof shall be admissible in evidence as and
constitute prima facie evidence of such transfer, assignment or
endorsement of such instrument from the person whose pur-
ported signature is affixed thereto to the person named therein,
irrespective of whether such assignment, transfer or endorse-
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ment shall have been acknowledged in the manner provided
by law for the acknowledgment of instruments relating to or
affecting title to real property or acknowledged at all. Such
section further provided it should be applicable to all of such
instruments which shall have been executed prior to the time
when such section took effect, as well as to all such instru-
ments which are executed after the time when the section takes
effect. (Concluded in March Issue)
ANNUAL BANQUET
The following committee has been appointed to arrange
the 1939 annual banquet. The banquet has never been held
at any stated time, and the desire this year is to fix the date to
suit the convenience of some nationally known speaker to be
secured who will stimulate the greatest interest. The task is
made difficult by our distance from the great centers of popu-
lation and the fact that most figures of national prominence
would be kept from other engagements for several days by a
trip to Denver. Suggestions as to speakers will be welcomed
by the committee.
MYLES P. TALLMADGE, Chairman
John P. Akolt S. Arthur Henry
L. Ward Bannister Erskine R. Myer
Clarence A. Bailey Gustave J. Ornauer
Irving Hale, Jr. Albert L. Vogl
Horace N. Hawkins, Jr. Floyd F. Walpole
LAWYER-MUSICIANS
All member of the bar association who have had musical training
and experience, either vocal or instrumental, please communicate with
the Editor, KE. 7771.
DUES
The Secretary's office desires to remind all members that dues
are now due and past-due; that it takes the filthy lucre to keep
the Association going, and even DICTA is obliged to look to some
extent to association dues in order to be maintained. So send in
your check now.
